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 In notes that have becomes known as the Fichte Studies, 
Friedrich von Hardenberg closely documented his intellectual journey 
through the 1794/95 Grundlage. The notes, some of them developed 
pieces of philosophical reflection, others mere jottings, attempt to both 
personally and philosophically reassemble the themes and vocabulary 
of Fichte’s first grand exposition of Wissenschaftslehre. Recent 
translation of the studies into English and an upsurge in scholarly 
interest in the early Jena Romantics on the part of literary theorists 
and philosophers alike occasion this look at the young Novalis’s 
reception of Fichte. While Jane Kneller and Manfred Frank have offered 
readings of the fragments that highlight the themes of the mediated 
character of representation, the endless nature of reflection, and the 
indefinite freedom that arises from the “free renunciation of the 
absolute” (FS, xvi), I think they underestimate the seriousness of the 
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young critic’s attempt to think the foundations of an absolute theory of 
consciousness with Fichte. Fichte himself struggled with the indefinite 
character of his project, the elusive character of its elements and 
language, the never-ending task of supporting the hypothetical 
synthesis of limited I and not-I by freely undertaken analysis. Novalis 
was not so much diverging from a finished and formulaic ‘absolute’ 
that Fichte offers – as if the Grundlage’s first principle statically 
captures the evanescent nature of the act that underlies and supports 
all consciousness – but launching with Fichte into the almost self-
undermining project of attempting to think that one act by 
transforming it through infinite dissection into an endless series of 
component acts and their partial syntheses (FTP 84). Expressed in 
fragments as striking such as: “Unending free activity arises in us 
through the free renunciation of the absolute – the only possible 
absolute that can be given us and that we only find through our 
inability to attain and know an absolute” (FS #566) and “An authentic 
philosophical system must systematize freedom and unendingness, or, 
to express it more strikingly, it must systematize systemlessness” (FS 
#[648]).  
Novalis’s train of thought lands him close to the paradoxical 
conclusions that Fichte reaches in the nova methodo lectures, where 
the initial postulation of an abstract self-reverting activity as a support 
for self-consciousness ends in the dispersed world of plural centers of 
consciousness as will, each a sensibly embodied I summoned to free 
action within social constraints (FTP, 119–120, 465; cp. FS #567). The 
embodied subject freely interacting with other free agents in a 
common sensible world seems to be a radically different endpoint for 
philosophical reflection than the ‘completed system’ that Fichte 
promised in his 1794 prospectus (Concept, EPW 113–119). Both Fichte 
and Novalis arrive at that point through working on – and working 
within – the limits of reflection.  
 
1. Fichte in the Fichte Studies  
It is difficult to get any sense of Novalis’s struggle with Fichtean 
conceptions without a patient reading through of Fichte Studies. He is 
contending with ideas and facts, with the critical philosopher’s 
awareness of the limitations of theory and with the poet’s sense of the 
fragile purchase of words on things. Fichte’s text is rarely addressed. It 
is not a matter of excerpts or sketches for developed critiques. The 
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critic is working on the matter, instead, on the fundamental lists of 
words that Fichte uses to indicate isolate and, as it were, freeze the 
underlying self-reverting activity. Where Fichte finds a single ‘self-
reversion’, however, Novalis finds doubling, reversal and inversion, 
everywhere he looks. If Fichte somewhat problematically employs a 
term lifted from anthropology, e.g., feeling, to designate a phase of 
the ontological process, Novalis tends to liberate words from stable 
referents, to release them into a play of change and exchange, and 
finally to obliterate the anchorage of terms in any stable designation.  
This process of reversion and inversion can be seen in the first 
group of fragments. While Novalis explores the grand themes of 
feeling, reflection and life in his early meditations – showing himself 
the acute reader of the Grundlage, following not the logic of its 
deductions and principles, but the thematic guidance of its severed 
parts – his initial comments on consciousness display a sense of the 
shiftiness and luminescence of the domain of knowledge, and of the 
arbitrary way that words or signs designate by hovering over and 
hollowing out things, as it were:  
 
“Consciousness is a being outside of being that is within being.  
 
But what is that?  
 
What is outside being must not be a proper being. 
 
An improper being outside being is an image – Consciousness is 
consequently an image of being within being.  
 
A better explanation of the image. /Sign/ Theory of signs. / 
Theory of presentation, i.e., of not-being, within being, in order 
to let being be there for itself in a certain respect (FS #2).”  
 
We have all the elements here for a theory of expression as well 
as for a theory of consciousness. What reflects does not reproduce; 
the sign designates because signifier is not signified; the ‘there for 
itself” function of image, presentation, or word arises from the 
loosening or disjoining of being in sign. One thing is put in place of an 
other, which it is not. Consciousness, the reader of signs, lives in the 
distance between the two, and is both author and decipherer of the 
ever shuffling substitution between them – or is consciousness itself 
nothing but the shuffle?  
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Novalis clearly sees this line of thought is vertiginous, that 
reference disappears in the game of intersubstitution if the not of not-
being is the core. The not is just a little hook on which to hang 
everything, and on which nothing can depend – “it just grasps a 
handful of darkness.” It must inhere in something, the ultimate 
something, life. But if word and thing rest in this third, then life 
escapes the grasp of sign. From the start, philosophy is doomed, for it 
is compelled to try to say the unsayable. Philosophy can only aim at its 
object, not get there; we sense the ground by feeling the limit that 
circumscribes us. We are not transcendent, but know only “in the I 
and for the I.” If philosophy is to do anything, then, it must operate 
poetically, turn from its object to the crafting of an image, and in the 
image discern the object it cannot see: “In order to conceive itself the 
I must represent to itself another like itself, anatomize, as it were. This 
other being that is like the I is none other than the I itself. The I 
similarly becomes aware of this act of alienation and respective 
production only through this same conceptual exercise –It finds that it 
is the same in its own case, that the act that precedes this reflection 
can occur in no other way” (FS #3).  
The philosopher’s abstraction-reflection is the poet’s creation, 
mirroring in an other. Novalis instinctively sees Fichte’s difficulty with 
locating his subject-matter and making a beginning: the intellectual 
intuition or sense of sense which is to be the foundation and tool of 
Wissenschaftslehre is never absent but never-present in a unitary and 
sufficient way. It is said to be, supposed to be an intuition of self-
activity, but self-activity is never given as such, nor completely 
represented as enacted. It must be glimpsed, says Fichte, in the 
mirror of our moral life, in the self-activity I ought to be, rather than 
the external parade of sensory states that I am (Second Introduction, 
SK 38–41). I must construct myself, fictionalize myself, to be who I 
am and see who I am.  
Novalis’s instinct, however, is to recoil before the image of 
endless distorted self-imaging, or the journey ever onward to an I that 
never fully active or self-realized. –Much of this recoil may be 
explicable from the standpoint of the poet’s life: as Sophie’s health 
fails, Friedrich’s courage fails. Moments of despair interrupt the march 
of thought like stabs of pain.–As thinker and critic, however, Novalis 
opts for an aesthetic eternity, available in the moment, and rejects the 
long-march of Fichte’s elongated moral striving. Near the end of the 
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Studies, in passages of unusual clarity, he sees the situation this way: 
we are, in part, self-determining freedom, and the I has a greater 
purchase on activity the more it creatively transforms what is given, 
the present world. We are to actively put the world under us – a task 
of endlessly postponed fulfillment. “Our [creative] power gets as much 
free play as it has world under it. But since our nature, or the fullness 
of our being is unending, we can never reach this goal in time.”  
But evidently the poet thinks delayed gratification is one thing, 
but endlessly delayed satisfaction of the drive for knowledge another. 
He invokes a metaphysical solution, rejects the rule of time and 
process, buys out of Fichte’s infinite moral quest, and in a Faustian 
move declares the moment eternalized and infinite satisfaction gained. 
Continues Novalis,”– But since we are also in a sphere outside time, 
we must reach it [the goal] there in every moment, or, better, if we 
want, in this sphere we are able to be pure simple substance. /Here is 
morality and peace of mind, because an endless striving after what lies 
ever out of reach before us seems unbearable/” (FS #[647]).  
Simple substance is certainly ‘endless striving’ pacified, but by 
what right can the thinker dissolve the tension between doing and 
being, between simply acting and being in a state, that Fichte’s 
approach to philosophy brings with it?  
One answer is, of course, that there are more voices in the 
Studies than those of Fichte and Novalis. Spinoza is present, and the 
critic employs his cosmological triad of ‘God, Nature, and I’ in several 
contexts, all of which suggest an endlessly vital or dynamic ground of 
being that is partially embodied in and viewed through separate but 
opposed finite domains. In one fascinating but cryptic fragment, 
Novalis translates Fichte’s view of the I into this Spinozistic theology: 
“Our nature is immanent – our reflection [is] transcendent. We are 
God – we think as individuals. If transcendence becomes immanence, 
it is the idea of divinity –that is, if representation becomes intuition, 
then we are in the realm of the divine I –Imagination, as intuition, is 




This fascinating passage shows the philosophical perils of the 
idealist-romantic dialogue. If one can permit oneself to slip away from 
the dynamic, self-constructive or transcendental psychological mode of 
Fichte’s thinking, ’dogmatism’ is already at the door and the way is at 
hand to dissolve all of Fichte’s insoluble problems–the 
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unrepresentability of act or agility as such,the simply categorical lag 
between action and reflection, production and recognition, or the 
nobility and the frustration of the unrealizable moral project of making 
all id into ego. One forgets that one crafted the image of another self 
solely to understand and see oneself. No longer is one looking into a 
mirror, then, but simply staring at a map of the heavens. Fichte was 
notoriously impatient with Schelling for thinking that a dogmatic or 
critical approach to truth was an indifferent ‘lifestyle’ choice. 
2. Playing with Words: Kant’s Categories and a Theory of Signs 
 
Perhaps the most surprising thing about Novalis’s reflections on 
Fichte is his freedom from the latter’s precision in vocabulary and 
argument. Where the philosopher deduces, the poet plays. Indeed 
sometimes he just plays with words, turning them inside out, 
interchanging them, running through lists of roots and prefixes while 
remarking on the philosophical power of the German tongue (cf. FS 
#’s 342, 363). Most of the critic’s intellectual playfulness, however, is 
reserved for his constant mulling over the chestnut of Kantian 
philosophy, the origin and interrelations of the categories. Novalis’s 
first thoughts on the categories, inspired as much by Fichte as by 
Kant’s slim comments, suggest that they are thought experiments 
undertaken in intellectual intuition (FS#23) or modes of combining 
form and matter in the I in such a way that the familiar thesis, 
antithesis, synthesis pattern emerges. In addition, Novalis claims that 
the dynamic categories of relation and modality are the ground of the 
formal ones of quality and quantity, with the thesis of the formal ones 
(unity, reality) corresponding to the synthesis of the dynamic ones 
(reciprocity, and necessity) (FS #28).The influence of Fichte’s 
vocabulary is evident in such constructions, and the world-picture of 
the Wissenschaftslehre seems to be vindicated: ‘reality’ is the sphere 
of appearances generated by contrary activities, operating under 
necessary laws, producing a uniform texture of objectivity for the 
limited I. Novalis attempts, for instance, to vindicate Kant’s famously 
undeduced twelve categories in a Fichtean, i.e., binary and dynamic 
way. The categories of quality are figured as modes of the concept, 
determined by the interworkings of concept and intuition; those of 
relation are accounted modes of feeling, determined by the 
interweaving of feeling and reflection, while the modal categories are 
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viewed as the forms of sensation, arising from the dance of concept 
and sensation (FS #297). Novalis does employ contrasting pairs of the 
elements of knowledge in this attempt to derive the categories, but 
they are material factors, not mere rules or schemata. The reader can 
become suspicious that either the critic is attempting to derive the 
formal from the material–a category mistake about the categories–or, 
worse yet, that these terms are being bandied about in almost 
arbitrary fashion, any term being able to function in the place of any 
other, depending on context and starting point (see FS #’s 599 and 
641). The writer seems astoundingly far from understanding the 
categories who can pen these notes on the same page: “Categories – 
original properties of a noumenon” (FS #575) and “Kantian categories 
are merely for accidental substance” (FS #[564]).  
I can at best hazard a guess about Novalis’s penchant for 
wordplay in lieu of deduction. Directly after an attempt to derive the 
Kantian twelve from modifications of modality – surely the most 
abstract interpretation possible – Novalis writes: “Principles of algebra 
applied to metaphysics” (FS #600). This of course suggests that there 
are necessary laws or algorithms at play, expressing a contrast 
between two fundamental values or qualities – and that would fit 
nicely with all of the critic’s inversions of categories or transformations 
of opposites, one into the other. But it might also suggest that the 
fundamental values or qualities are themselves variables, and that an 
indefinite range of contrasting elements might be specified as the 
values of these variables. Algebraic metaphysics, then, might means 
endless intersubstitutability, as in a Leibnizean universe of monadic 
mirrors, each of whose being is a function of the distortions of the 
perceptions of all others. This would make being chaotic and 
representation (or sign) arbitrary – exactly what Novalis suggests in a 
long passage where, investigating the interrelations between time, 
space, and matter, the critic from time to time steps back, observes 
his procedures and voices the following metacomment and questions:  
 
“It is as impossible to think of space without time as it is to 
think of intuition without a representation.  
 
/Time is the form of space in the imagination 
/Why dichotomous oppositions everywhere?  
/Everything is recognizable through opposition  
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/An image is a represented intuition.  
/A sign is an intuited representation. 
/Symbolic formative power [Bildungskraft]. Imagination. 
/ What are representation and intuition? 
/There is no absolute form, and no absolute material 
[Stoff].  
 
They all condition each other alternatively in the circle.” (FS # 
226)  
 
What does this mean? In a Fichtean world, I might suggest, 
things arise as appearances – or illusions – floating on a bed of 
activities that we can sometimes understand as opposed, refractory 
and mutually limiting, and we can at other times understand as one 
activity, but can never understand as simultaneously one and self-
opposed. Novalis comes to some clarity about this later in the 
fragments, when he is working on the important doctrine of the 
momentary fact-event and the two opposite roles it can play, state 
(Zustand) and object (Gegenstand) or sensation and impression: 
“Every thing, like every ground, is relative. It is a thing insofar as it is 
opposed to a thing. Only the whole is real. –A thing would only be 
absolutely real if it was not again a constituent. The whole rests more 
or less – like a game in which people sit on each other’s knees in a 
circular fashion without a chair.” (FS #445)  
A thoroughgoing relativity and intersubstitutability reigns in 
Novelis’s world of appearance, yet interconnection through the power 
of the not – the distinction, opposition, exclusion, or semantic contrast 
that forms the world of representation (sign, image, word) – keeps the 
parts connected, keep being open to imagination: the power of 
unification.  
At the foundation of this world picture are ideas borrowed from 
Kant (schema) and Fichte (free activity as self-determination). Novalis 
brings them together in a dense passage early in the Studies on the 
theory of signs. Signification – meaningful interchange or 
intersubstitution, generative of the relation “standing for” – happens 
when one signifying agent freely or arbitrary forms a relation between 
‘sign’ and something ‘signified’. But this relationship can be 
communicated to a second signifying agent only if there is some 
structure or necessity, first, to the relationship itself and, secondly, to 
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the way it is conveyed. The necessary element enters in the material 
or sensible character of the sign, which is the constant in the 
communication between the two signifying agents (FS #12, pp. 7–8).  
How can the sensible sign, supposing that its materiality means 
that it stays the same and appears in the same way to both signifiers, 
secure communication of an arbitrarily chosen meaning to a second 
signifiers? Some signs must be natural or involve a homology between 
sign and signified; Novalis does not elaborate, but one might think of 
imitation, which might give way to gesture, which in turn might give 
way to pointing, and so on. That would be the material side of the 
relationship, which Novalis quickly treats. More interesting to him are 
the immaterial conditions of communication, first, that the first 
signifying agent freely determine herself and her world in the act of 
signification, and second, that there is some general sort of schema 
available for the mapping of the conceptual onto the sensible and vice 
versa (FS #12, pp. 9–10). I am not sure whether this account of 
conditions, material and immaterial, supplies an adequate account of 
the nature of sign and signification. It is similar, however, to the 
account of human interpersonality that Fichte supplies in early in the 
Foundations of Natural Right to support the social-political Ur-
phenomenon of recognition (FNR 53–79). Only if somehow the 
presence of the immaterial can be manifested in the material and yet 
understood by another immaterial being, can the taking-the-other-as-
conscious gesture of mutuality between humans be initiated; similarly, 
only if what is meant is shown in what is not meant, the material sign, 
can what is meant be communicated. The process of signification is 
that of ciphering and deciphering.  
 
3. Subjects as Placeholders, Language as Verb  
If, as I argued in the last section, for Novalis ontology mirrors 
semiotics and the beings of appearance are, as entities, only relative 
to one another or in distinction from one another, then being as a 
whole is only a play of appearances or a dance of illusion.  
Indeed, the concept of illusion [Schein] is built into the concept 
of truth, for when things trade places – as they will in Novalis’s world 
of change– parts and whole are reversed, or part is lifted out and 
presented as whole (image, signification, transposition). Skirting 
perilously close to nonsense, the critic affirms: “Illusion and truth 
together constitute only one actual reality. Illusion is the original form 
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of truth, of original material. It is truth related to itself – reality is for 
reality only through relation. /The form of being is not-being – the 
form of not-being [is] being./ The relation of not-being is being. 
Consequently truth is existence –the form of illusion, of not-being – 
and illusion [is] the form of existence.” (FS #232).  
It is an untidy world picture, perhaps, where things turn into 
their opposites as the price they pay for being able to stand for each 
other. Indeed, Novalis’s universe is one of constant change and 
interchange–or momentary fact–carried on the surface of the incessant 
moves and countermoves of action, imagination, and will that Fichte’s 
Wissenschaftslehre makes fundamental. The critic offers two 
formulations of this changing world, one categorical and one dynamic. 
In categorical terms, the underlying activity of I is change in the form 
of exchange – exchange between essence and property being ‘sphere’ 
[jointure of limited I and limited not-I, in Fichte’s language], between 
whole and part being ‘relation’, and between cause and effect being 
‘change’ (FS #451). In the underlying world of activity that is 
philosophy’s hypothesis, “being is a rhythmic relation, the active and 
passive exchange between the positing and the positable.” Viewed on 
the surface, being is indeed, permanence – but only permanence of 
change, positing, and exchange. (FS #456) In this context, what am 
I? What is I? Only the locus of change and transaction: “I am – means 
I find myself in a universal relation, or I change. – It is part of change 
in general, without an opposite. – an exposing to all possible uses, to 
original thought[.] Refrain – repetition – expression of mere activity 
without object and content – first play.” (FS #455)  
In this world of shift and interchange of components, Novalis 
destabilizes all the components of epistemic and psychological 
explanation that Fichte so carefully segregated. In a world of poetic 
imagination, where anything can stand for anything else and form is 
nothing but function or power, feeling and reflection, intuition and 
concept merge into one another. These are all factors in the 
interchanging dynamic of the one self-opposed activity, after all, and it 
is imagination’s function to mix up again what philosophic analysis has 
distinguished. Generally, Novalis will insist there are four features to 
any cognitive episode: on the objective or content side, feeling and 
that which establishes it, intuition, on the formal or subjective side, 
reflection and that which reflection establishes, sensation; these 
elements correspond to the four classes of cateogries (FS #294). 
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These terms have the general sense they do in Wissenschaftslehre, 
they designate collisions of opposed activities that have been imaged 
as a ‘there’ and subsequently solidified into a ‘something’ due to the 
reverberations of further activities. So while in terms of human 
faculties of cognition, there are imagination, feeling, understanding, 
and conception, these four are really two in terms of their product: 
imagination and feeling together arise as intuition (the real element, 
that which supplies the ‘there’), while understanding and conception 
arise as presentation – the cognitive counterpart of the ‘there’ or the 
‘aware’ (FS #215). All of these matters are subjected to all possible 
permutations in the first two groups of fragments, it seems, but one 
can safely assume that Novalis is operating with Fichte’s lexicon in 
hand.  
The third and fourth groups of fragments introduce a new factor 
into Novalis’s elements of knowledge, the idea of the ‘stand’ or ‘trace’ 
that can function in either of two positions, in the subject as condition 
or sensation or as the outwardly projected object or impression. The 
same ‘thing’ – in the sense that anything can be a thing that is but the 
product of imagination – or ‘stand’ can appear as Zustand or 
Gegenstand, as the momentary cognitive state of the subject or its 
momentary condition as represented.  
The argument Novalis uses to introduce this distinction is novel: 
in general, we distinguish subject and object, but insofar as reflection 
seizes upon anything, whatever it targets is object, never subject. 
Given, therefore, that reflection can seize upon an object of cognition, 
e.g., a determinate sensation, it can turn round one hundred eighty 
degrees and investigate that which is opposed to the object – not the 
subject, but another, subject-like object (FS #288). Presentation and 
object, sensation and reflection are not fixed contents or fixed 
activities, though they do sort themselves out as ‘subjective’ and 
‘objective’ in empirical consciousness (FS #’s 290, 292). Sprouting up 
from originary activity, each is characterized by the other. The one 
item that is most indicate of this epistemic ambiguity is the Janus-like 
‘stand’ – Zustand or state in context, Gegenstand or object in another. 
Only if we erroneously insist that there “is” a fixed inside and a fixed 
outside, or that subject and object are real, and not constructed, will 
this duplicity of the single appearance be confusing.  
Novalis provides further detail on this intriguing idea of an 
epistemically neutral expression that functions as subject or object, 
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depending on the context in which it is placed. First of all, the ‘stand’ is 
activity or change, displacement from one position to another, so its 
bipolarity or double-function capacity should not be amazing (FS 
#306). The change of position involved in not displacement inwards, 
as the realist might imagine, but displacement outwards. “Activity 
begins in the state. It always ends in the object” (FS #315, see also 
310–314). Novalis ties this all together in the following passage, where 
he suggests that the ‘stand’, where it is and however it functions, is 
not so much a crystallization of being as an activity and a knowing: 
“On the concept of standing [das Stehen} Stand [Stand] – represents 
and is. It is not what it represents, and does not represent what it is. 
The state [Zustand] stands for [literally: “to”: Zu] and also against 
[Gegen]. Thus too the object [Gegenstand] stands for and against. […] 
Intuiting and representing lies in the concept of standing. Stand feels 
insofar as it is, it senses, insofar as it represents. It feels inward, in 
relation to itself – it senses outward, in relation to an other –It intuits 
in relation to itself –it represents in relation to [an] other – this is the 
Stand in Gegenstand [i.e., object]. In Zustand [i.e., state] everything 
is just the opposite.” (FS #330)  
With this intriguing notion of the ‘stand’ or trace-project, 
metamorphosed from internal activity to outward shape, Novalis has a 
fully articulated model of a momentary Tatsache, the monadic flash of 
activity become knowing-being. This is his own creation, not derived 
from Fichte, but capable of integration with the more static and 
abstract apparatus of the 1794/95 Grundlage. When Novalis, quite late 
in his reflections, finally turns his attention to Fichte’s principles and 
conclusions, he is able to assimilate the position with startling 
simplicity, shrinking the philosopher’s moral universe into his simple 
‘stand’ or moment-fact: “Being, being-I, being free and oscillating are 
all synonyms – one expression refers to the others – it is simply the 
matter of a single fact.” (FS #556). Novalis goes on to note, however, 
that the ‘simple fact’ is not the mere glob of time, the surpassed fact, 
but a cosmic or eternal moment – the spiritual moment in which we 
live, move and have our being as “an identically eternal acting genius 
– being-I.” Though we want to reify this world and chop it into 
persistent things, or atomize its eternal ‘is’ into endless before and 
after, its structure comes to the fore in language and its grammar of 
presentation. For the world of activity become I, the sentence or unit 
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of expression must be parsed somewhat unconventionally: “Verb – 
Substantive –adjective – particle.” (FS #340)  
The deep connection between activity, ontology, and semiotics 
that mark Novalis’s Fichte Studies signal a profound thinking-along-
with that is better than any discipleship. Whether Fichte could have 
been nudged by further contact with Novalis and his fellow to a more 
satisfying and dynamic presentation of Wissenschaftslehre is an open 
question. A good author is lucky to get a good reader.  
 
Endnote  
1. The Spinozistic triad of God, Nature, and I was part of 
Novalis’s vocabulary from the start of the Fichte Studies. 
Remarks 142–152 show a sustained attempt to employ that 
language. The poet’s most striking remark in that regard is: “ 
Spinoza ascended as far as nature – Fichte to the I, or the 
person. I ascend to the thesis God.” Perhaps this portends the 
mystic theology of later fragments – “We shall understand the 
world when we understand ourselves, because we and it are 
integral halves. We are God’s children, divine seeds. One day 
we shall be what our Father is” (Logological Fragments, PW 
61) –and of Hymns to the Night. See also FS #’s 71 and 303.  
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